

FATHERS AND SONS IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC* AND *PHILEBUS*

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, αἰὲν μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδαιμάντου ἡγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάννυ γε ἥσθην καὶ εἶπον· Οὐ κακῶς εἰς ὑμᾶς, ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐλεγείων ἐποίησεν ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής, εὐδοκίμησαντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην, εἰπών—

παῖδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θεῖον γένος ἀνδρός·

τοῦτό μοι, ὦ φίλοι, εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν· πάννυ γὰρ θεῖον πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης ἄμεινον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ.

I had always admired Glaucon and Adeimantus for their nature, but when I heard this, I was quite extraordinarily pleased and said: ‘*Sons of that man*, Glaucon’s lover did not do badly to begin the poem he wrote when you had distinguished yourselves in the battle at Megara with the words “Sons of Ariston, divine stock of a famous man”. That, my friends, was well put. For there must indeed be a touch of the divine in you if you can make such a case for injustice when you are not in fact persuaded that it is better than justice. (Plato, *Republic* 2.367e6–368a7)

Glaucon and Adeimantus, dissatisfied with Socrates’ refutation of Thrasymachus in Book 1, have been restating the sophist’s case for the view that injustice (provided you can get away with it) is a better choice in life than justice. Their challenge sets Socrates his task for the remainder of the *Republic*, to show that justice is in all circumstances the better choice. But first he pauses to praise the two brothers for being able to argue so effectively on behalf of a thesis they do not believe, in order to force him to refute it more convincingly than he did before. My interest is in the detail of this praise, especially the address ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός. Who is ‘that man’? It is not to be taken for granted that it is Ariston, the κλεινοῦ ἀνδρός of the verses composed by Glaucon’s lover in praise of the brothers’ conduct at the battle of Megara. This is a pivotal moment in the dialogue, apt for a literary flourish.

I

Way back in 1896 James Adam proposed, following a suggestion by Stallbaum, that ‘that man’ is in fact Thrasymachus, who ‘fathered’ the position now taken up by Glaucon and Adeimantus.¹ Like Stallbaum, as parallel for a dialectical rather than a literal father he cited *Philebus* 36d6–7, adding that it is the only other place in the Platonic corpus where a comparable phrase is found. On the Stallbaum–Adam account, ὦ παῖ ἐκείνου τᾶνδρός there refers playfully to Protarchus as the ‘child’ of Philebus, not because Philebus is his biological father—Protarchus is actually the son of Callias (19b)—but because Protarchus has inherited from Philebus the task of defending hedonism against Socrates’ critique. As Protarchus himself said earlier (19a), he is τοῦ λόγου διάδοχος, Philebus’ successor in a discussion begun before we

¹ J. Adam, ‘Plato, *Republic* II. 368a and *Symposium* 174b’, *CR* 10 (1896), 237–9, summarized later in his edition, *The Republic of Plato*, edited with critical notes, commentary and appendices (Cambridge, 1902), ad loc.; Godofredus Stallbaum, *Platonis Politia sive De Republica*, Recensuit, prolegomenis et commentariis illustravit (Gothae et Erfordiae, 1858²), ad loc. Stallbaum’s idea was dismissed as ‘ridiculous’ by B. Jowett and Lewis Campbell, *Plato’s Republic*, the Greek text edited, with notes and essays, 3 vols (Oxford, 1894), 3.78–9. I hope to turn their ridicule back on its authors.

start to read.² Just so, Adam argued, Glaucon and Adeimantus have inherited from Thrasymachus the task of defending the advantages of injustice against Socrates' Book 1 critique. In both cases, moreover—though neither Stallbaum nor Adam thought to add this—the 'children' are more reasonable than their 'father', less determined to stick to their position come what may. They are more open to persuasion than their headline 'father'. Discussion with them has a chance of arriving at worthwhile positive conclusions.

Thus far Adam, with an extra point to strengthen the parallel between *Republic* and *Philebus*. Further support for his *Philebus* interpretation was provided by Hackforth, who boldly translated ὁ παῖς 'κείνου ἀνδρός as 'Philebus the younger' and observed that at 18a1–2 'Philebus the elder' had asked a question about the relevance of something just said which matches the question Socrates is raising with his successor at 36d. This dovetailing with an earlier passage of the same dialogue helps to explain why it is here, rather than anywhere else in the discussion, that Protarchus is addressed as the 'child' of Philebus.³

But Adam's interpretation did not go unchallenged. Weighing in against him came another redoubtable Platonic scholar, Paul Shorey, with a reference to the tradition that the followers of Pythagoras would speak of him as 'that man' rather than by name. In Shorey's view, 'that man' at *Republic* 368a is a sign of respect, more appropriate to Aristotle than to Thrasymachus in a 'passage that celebrates the prowess of Plato's family in war'.⁴

To this the obvious reply is that, while 'that man' can indeed be a sign of respect, in the *Philebus* parallel it is not. Philebus neither deserves nor receives any respect from Socrates.⁵ ἐκείνον τὸν Θαλῆν in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (180), cited by Shorey as a more colloquial version of the usage, is not honorific at all. Strepsiades discounts 'that Thales', whom people go on about, as a mere nobody in comparison with Socrates. Socrates' student picks up the phrase and speaks in Pythagorean style of his Master as 'κείνος' (195) and αὐτός (219, alluding to αὐτὸς ἔφα), but his language is itself part of the dramatist's joke. In short, the *tone* of the phrase 'that man' depends on the context. And the immediate context here in the *Republic* makes ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, if referred to Thrasymachus, sound just like ἐκείνον τὸν Θαλῆν in the *Clouds*. Yes, the sophist is a mighty character (*Phdr.* 267c: τὸ τοῦ Χαλκεδονίου σθένος), much talked about,⁶ but Aristotle and his family are far more deserving of the reader's attention.

The *Philebus* parallel has also been disputed. Badham countered Stallbaum by saying that 'the word ἐκείνος is often substituted for the proper name in speaking of an absent or deceased person with respect' and referring 'κείνου to Callias. Bury proposed that 'that man' is Gorgias, who is mentioned (albeit much later at 58a) as

² The dialogue opens with Socrates saying Ὅρα δὴ, Πρώταρχε, τίνα λόγον μέλλεις παρὰ Φιλίβου δέχεσθαι (11a). Since 19b is the only mention of Protarchus' father Callias, I surmise that it is a clue left to guide our reading of his dialectical paternity at 36d; Philebus' father is nowhere indicated.

³ R. Hackforth, *Plato's Examination of Pleasure*, a translation of the *Philebus*, with introduction and commentary (Cambridge, 1958), 70.

⁴ P. Shorey, 'Note on Plato *Republic* 368a', *Classical Philology* 12 (1917), 436, citing Iamb. *VP* 88 and 255. A note ad loc. in his still unsurpassed Loeb translation of the *Republic* (Cambridge, MA, 1930–35) reasserts, without further support, his rejection of Adam's account. Much of Shorey's argument is unwittingly duplicated by D. J. Allan, '*Republic* 368a', *CR* 63 (1949), 43–4.

⁵ Allan avoids this difficulty by referring 'that man' to the 'original from whom the fictitious character Philebus is drawn—very probably Eudoxus'. Most implausible.

⁶ He is mentioned more often than any other fifth-century rhetorician in the *Phaedrus* discussion of rhetoric.

Protarchus' teacher. More recently, Dorothea Frede completed the circle by adducing ὁ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός from *Republic* 368a as evidence to support a non-ironic reference to Protarchus' biological father Callias.⁷

I shall argue that Adam was right on both counts. As a first step, we need to look into the wider context of *Republic* 368a. Then we should take note of the *Philebus*' habit of making discreet allusions to other dialogues.

II

What Socrates is primarily celebrating in *Republic* 2 is not the physical courage that Plato's brothers showed at Megara in their younger days, when Glaucon had a lover,⁸ but their present intellectual courage in the battlefield of dialectical debate. Book 2 began with Socrates remarking that Glaucon, a man of high courage in everything (ἀεὶ ἀνδρείωτατος ὢν πρὸς ἅπαντα), displayed especial courage in refusing to accept that Thrasymachus had been adequately defeated in Book 1 (357a). As Plato's *Laches* contends (esp. 190e–191e), courage can be shown in all areas of life, not only in war.⁹ True courage is knowing what is properly to be feared and what not. When Glaucon demands that Socrates produce a genuinely persuasive proof of the benefits of justice, instead of the seeming proof with which he reduced the raging Thrasymachus to the quiescence of a charmed snake (357a–b, 358b), he shows himself properly afraid of making do with an inadequate grasp of the most important proposition in life. He shrinks from that, boldly assails Socrates with a barrage of questions about what kind of good he takes justice to be (357b–358a), and then mounts a vigorous renewal (358b7–c1: ἐπανανέωσομαι) of the case against justice. Adeimantus joins the fray at his side (362d7: ἐπάμυνε), with a scathing attack on the way traditional culture promotes justice: it encourages the young to think that *seeming* to be just is more important, and more rewarding, than the real thing. He calls upon Socrates, who has spent his whole life inquiring into justice, to give them something better (367de).

Tough talk, on both their parts, occasionally even rude (361e1–3, 362e1). Now a tough, no nonsense approach was what Thrasymachus brought to the discussion of justice in Book 1, opening with 'What balderdash (φλυαρία) is this that you have been talking?' (336b8–c1). In mounting their challenge, Glaucon and Adeimantus have adopted his combative style as well as much of his view of life as itself a combat in which 'justice' names the submissive behaviour of a loser. Hence Socrates' coy, ironically complimentary reference to Thrasymachus as 'that man'. In both substance and style they are his heirs, as Polemarchus was κληρονόμος to Cephalus' λόγος at 331e1. Cephalus, being both biological and dialectical father to Polemarchus,

⁷ Charles Badham, *Platonis Philebus*, with introduction and notes (London and Edinburgh, 1855), 55; Robert Gregg Bury, *The Philebus of Plato*, edited with introduction, notes and appendices (Cambridge, 1897), 74; Dorothea Frede, *Platon: Philebos*, Übersetzung und Kommentar (Göttingen, 1997), 47, n. 50. Bury and Frede also cite ὁ παῖ τοῦδ' ἀνδρός at *Soph. Trach.* 1017, which is hardly apposite because 'this man' is lying right there in front of his son and the speaker. Another firm rejection of Adam's twin proposals for *Rep.* 368a and *Phlb.* 36d is A. E. Taylor, *Plato: Philebus and Epinomis*, translation and introduction, edited by Raymond Klibansky (London, 1956), 145–6.

⁸ Nowadays he takes the role of ἐραστής, with quite an eye for the boys (474d–475a).

⁹ For courage in debate or intellectual pursuits, compare *Lach.* 194a; *Chrm.* 160e; *Grp.* 494d4; *Meno* 86b; *Phd.* 90e, 103b; *Parm.* 129e; *Cra.* 421c, 440d; *Tht.* 151d5, 177b,d, 205a; *Polit.* 262a, 263d; *Criti.* 108c.

combined the two paternal roles which are now shared out between Thrasymachus and Ariston.

For Ariston also receives credit for his sons' conduct in the discussion of the *Republic*. His name will recur twice. In Book 4 (427c6–d1) Socrates says to Adeimantus, 'There now, son of Ariston, your city may be considered as established', celebrating the completion of the lengthy business of constructing the ideal city, begun way back in Book 2 in order to provide a large-scale model of justice and virtue that will help meet the brothers' Thrasymachean challenge. Then in Book 9 (580b8–c1), when the model has been applied to compare the happiness of the just individual's life with the unhappiness of a series of increasingly unjust lives, Socrates celebrates the completion of an even lengthier project begun way back in Book 2 by asking Glaucon, 'Shall we hire a herald or shall I make the announcement that the son of Ariston judged the best and most just man to be the happiest?' On both occasions Ariston's name is associated with the central *constructive* enterprise of the dialogue. He presides over each of his sons' share in the cooperative response to the combative Thrasymachean challenge they mounted at the start of Book 2. And of course, as David Sedley has brilliantly pointed out,¹⁰ on both occasions a reader may hear a reference to the third son's achievement as author of the *Republic*, in which he orchestrated appropriately impressive parts for both Socrates and his two elder brothers.¹¹ Ariston's family's prowess in war was prelude to the largest, the most original, and the most courageously sustained work of philosophy the world had ever seen.

The difference between the combative and the co-operative contributions of Glaucon and Adeimantus explains why Plato would want to separate the two paternal roles which Cephalus combined, assigning one to Thrasymachus, the other to Ariston. The ultimate compliment to Ariston, however, comes at the end of my quotation. The brothers did not for one moment believe that injustice *is* the better choice. Their combative stance was a tactical manoeuvre to goad Socrates into action. Once he gets going, they become sympathetic, but never uncritical collaborators. They urge him on, raise objections, demand clarification of his more obscure pronouncements, and contribute pertinent knowledge of their own. They *want* to be persuaded that justice is the better choice, and they do their best, each in their own distinctive way, to help Socrates make the argument as cogent as possible.¹² Their biological father has reason to be proud of having brought them up so well—better, in fact, than I have so far indicated.

For what they want is to be properly convinced that justice is worth pursuing *for its own sake*, regardless of the rewards and consequences on which (as Adeimantus complains) poets and parents normally dwell when they preach justice to the young. Ariston, it turns out, brought up his sons against the grain of the culture. He is truly *ἄριστος*, this *Ἀρίστων*, sprung from a *θεῖον γένος*. It is to celebrate his educative influence that Plato, when reusing the verse of Glaucon's lover, plays on their father's

¹⁰ D. Sedley, 'The dramatis personae of Plato's *Phaedo*', in T. Smiley (ed.), *Plato, Hume, Wittgenstein, Proceedings of the British Academy* 85 (Oxford, 1995), at 4–5.

¹¹ Authorship is a third type of paternity thematized by Plato, especially in the conceit of the author as *ὁ πατήρ τοῦ λόγου* at *Phdr.* 257b and 275e (cf. also *Rep.* 330c).

¹² It is a travesty to call them either 'yes-men' (Gregory Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* [Cambridge, 1991], 249) or 'virtually indistinguishable' (Mary Whitlock Blundell, *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics* [Cambridge, 1989], 11).

name¹³ and hints—quite seriously, I would suppose—at divine inspiration for the whole family.

The moral influence of fathers is a theme that will recur later in the *Republic*, when Books 8 and 9 describe the origin of a series of unjust souls. The timocratic character begins as the son of a good father who for a while manages to nurture the rational part of his son's soul (549c–550b). His son in turn emulates his father's dedication to honour until that leads the whole family into poverty and disgrace, from which the son emerges as a niggardly oligarchic character (553a–e). He too has a son who starts off in the thrifty ways of his father but is seduced by pleasure and luxury, ending up a democratic dilettante who gives equal right of expression to every desire that comes along (558c–d, 559d–562a, 572c–d). The story is repeated with his son, who retains a democratic constitution in his soul as long as he is under his father's control (572d–e), but is finally taken over and tyrannized by lawless passion. Always the better values are assigned to the father, who may or may not be supported by other relatives. Conversely, Odysseus' talent for theft and perjury derives from his *maternal* grandfather (334a–b).

This brings me back to Cephalus and his heir Polemarchus. Opinions about Cephalus have varied widely between rose-tinted respect and vehement condemnation.¹⁴ Plato's ideas about the influence of fathers make it relevant to note that, in striking contrast to Thrasymachus, Polemarchus is ready to agree that justice is human virtue. He accepts it as a matter of course (335c5: *καὶ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη*), as he earlier accepted that good men are just and not the type to go in for injustice (334d). That should count as a point in favour of his father, alongside Socrates' testimony that the old man (unlike the oligarchic character of Book 8) is not overfond of money (330b–c). Limited and conventional as Cephalus' moral outlook may be, he has at least produced a son who shows unhesitating allegiance to justice. Polemarchus, moreover, is the one character in the dialogues whom we see converting whole-heartedly to Socratic philosophy as the result of realizing his own ignorance (334b, 335d–336a, 340a–c). Since his turn to philosophy is confirmed at *Phaedrus* 257b, that too should help his father's credit.

III

So far I have argued in favour of Adam's solution to the riddle on grounds internal to the *Republic*. Shorey's Pythagorean allusion is much less suited to the dramatic context.¹⁵ I now move to the *Philebus* to argue that ὁ παῖς 'κεῖνον τὰνδρός at 36d6–7 is far more than the mere parallel Adam took it to be. It is a deliberate reminiscence, which authorizes us to read ὁ παῖδες ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἀνδρός at *Republic* 368a in terms of dialectical rather than biological paternity.

Let me return to Socrates' question at *Republic* 580bc: 'Shall we hire a herald or

¹³ Adam saw the pun, but was reasonably rebuked by Shorey for thinking it a half-ironical compliment to Thrasymachus.

¹⁴ 'An upright old gentleman' (W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, IV: *Plato the Man and his Dialogues: Earlier Period* [Cambridge, 1975], 439), 'limited' and 'complacent' (Julia Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic* [Oxford, 1981], 18–21), 'a life . . . split between sinning and repenting' (Allan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato*, translated, with notes and an interpretive essay [New York and London, 1968], 313). More choice quotes, leading to a thoroughly sympathetic appreciation of the man, in John Beversluis, *Cross-examining Socrates: A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato's Early Dialogues* (Cambridge 2000), 185–97.

¹⁵ Not to mention that the *Republic's* allusions to Pythagoras (600b) and Pythagoreans (530d–e with 531b–c) are somewhat distanced and critical.

shall I make the announcement that the son of Ariston judged the best and most just man to be the happiest?' In its original context, this follows a question about how Glaucon ranks the five lives they have examined. Which comes first in happiness, which second, and so on? Glaucon, like a judge awarding prizes at a choral competition, favours them in the order they entered the discussion: first in merit and happiness is the kingly philosopher, second the timocratic character, then the oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical souls, each of whom fares worse than his predecessor. The son of Ariston (Glaucon, Plato) graciously allows Socrates to make the announcement himself. But the *Philebus* too stages a prize-giving, one in which *Philebus*' favourite, pleasure, is the loser by a very long way. The first of five prizes goes to measure and things associated with due measure. 'You will say it in every possible way, Protarchus, *by sending out messengers* (ἀγγέλους) and by telling those nearby, that pleasure is neither the first nor the second possession to have' (66a). Those messengers, I submit, are a reminder and evocation of the herald passed over at the earlier prize-giving in the *Republic*.¹⁶

Another likely case of reminiscence in the *Philebus* is δεύτερος πλοῦς at 19c, which is bound to evoke the famous 'second voyage' at *Phaedo* 99cd.¹⁷ There it was Socrates, here Protarchus who is mindful of his own ignorance, both of them recoiling from a vastly ambitious explanatory enterprise beyond their power. In each dialogue it is modesty and a lack of expertise that dictates the 'second best'.¹⁸

Yet again, at *Philebus* 20b Socrates remembers hearing—in a dream or when properly awake (ὄναρ ἢ καὶ ἐγρηγορώς)—about pleasure and wisdom (φρόνησις), that the good is neither of them but some additional third thing, different from these and better (ἄμεινον) than both. Readers of the *Republic* should remember¹⁹ that he was certainly awake when in Book 6 he argued that the good is neither pleasure, as the many believe, nor wisdom (φρόνησις), as proposed by more sophisticated types—amongst whom, it is often thought, should be included Socrates himself as portrayed in earlier dialogues. In the Sun simile that follows (507a–509c) he announced that, just as eyes need the light of the sun as a 'third thing' (507e1) to see visible objects clearly, so the intellect needs illumination from the Form of Good if it is to gain knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of intelligible objects. Consequently, knowledge and truth are 'goodlike' (509a3: ἀγαθοειδής),²⁰ but not the good. The good, he said, is 'other and finer than these' (508e5–6: ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων), and in so saying he was properly awake in the full metaphysical sense of the word. For in Book 5 (476b–d) he had explained that only philosophers are awake to the sensible world we live in, because they alone are aware of the difference between Forms and their sensible participants. Everyone else lives out their life in a cognitive dream. Socrates, in other words, has woken up to the fact that the good is to be sought in a higher realm, not in worldly pleasures or worldly wisdom.

¹⁶ Frede (n. 7), 368, is on my side this time ('eine Art von Selbstzitat bei Platon', 'ein deutliches Echo'), underlining the role in both passages of the number 5. Compare Damascius, *In Plat. Phlb.* 250 W: 'Only two proclamations (κηρύγματα) occur in all Plato's dialogues, the one here against pleasure, the other in the *Republic* in defence of justice, of which the latter is undeservedly despised, while the former is undeservedly valued' (trans. Westerink).

¹⁷ Here Frede (n. 7), 168, will say no more than that 'Selbstzitat' is possible.

¹⁸ As again at *Polit.* 300c, whether or not this should be read as a reminiscence of the *Phaedo*.

¹⁹ As David Sedley reminded me. No mention of the possibility in any of the commentators I have cited.

²⁰ Shorey's translation 'boniform' nicely catches the effect of a word which was probably coined by Plato for this occasion.

In this instance it is hard to tell whether the *Philebus* means to replace the Good by measure or to say that measure is a first approximation to that Form of Forms. But some correction of the *Republic* is surely meant at *Philebus* 34e13–35a2:

SOC. Now thirst is a desire?

PROT. Yes, for drink.

SOC. For drink, or for being filled with drink?

PROT. For being filled, I suppose.

Protarchus' first answer is identical with the view Socrates argued for at *Republic* 437de, where he got Glaucon to agree that thirst *qua* thirst is for drink *tout court*.²¹ The *Philebus* is the dialogue in which the 'replenishment' theory of pleasure gets its most metaphysical treatment, with replenishment subsumed under the wider category of *γένεσις* or becoming (53c–54d). That requires the object of desire to be a process rather than a thing.

So far I have given five examples of intertextual connection between the *Philebus* and other dialogues, all of them fairly evident, I hope, once pointed out. And there are many more, varying in their degree of significance. Such reminiscences are calculated to elicit a smile of recognition from those who know the corpus well. Each is an occasion for one of the pure pleasures of learning described at 51e–52b, the unsought discovery of a connection you had not felt the need to think about. For my purposes the most telling example is the least obtrusive.

Adam's observation was that ὦ παῖ 'κείνου τάνδρός at *Philebus* 36d is the only other occurrence in the Platonic corpus of phrasing similar to ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός at *Republic* 368a. Likewise, there is one and only one precedent in the corpus for a little phrase used by Philebus when he gives up defending hedonism and hands over to Protarchus: ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως νικᾶν ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει· σὺ δέ, Πρώταρχε, αὐτὸς γνώσῃ (12a7–8), which translates as 'To me it seems and will continue to seem that pleasure wins on every point—but you, Protarchus, must decide for yourself.' That precedent is Callicles at *Gorgias* 505c9, who says αὐτὸς γνώσῃ at the *exactly parallel moment* when he gives up seriously defending hedonism. And here we have a helpful gloss by Olympiodorus on what αὐτὸς γνώσῃ means: ἀντὶ τοῦ 'εἴ τι θέλεις, ποίει· ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ μέλει' (In *Plat. Gorg.* 177.25–6 Westerink). The gloss confirms that Callicles' tone is dismissive: 'It's up to you, for I don't care.'²²

The parallel between the two occurrences of αὐτὸς γνώσῃ is hardly accidental.²³ The dramatic turn points up a *philosophical* defect in hedonism itself. Thoroughgoing hedonism of the kind that both Callicles and Philebus advocate cannot be rationally defended to the end. Not that they care about that. But by exhibiting their indifference to the outcome of rational argument, Plato shows us the cost of their pleasures. In giving up on reason itself, they lose all human dignity.

With αὐτὸς γνώσῃ I rest my case. If that is a deliberate reminiscence, ὦ παῖ 'κείνου τάνδρός at 36d6–7 is even more likely to be reminiscence, not the mere parallel Adam took it to be. If so, the author of the *Philebus* read 'that man' at *Republic* 368a1 as a reference to Thrasymachus, not Ariston. Since the author of the *Philebus* had inside

²¹ Again, no *Philebus* commentator remarks on a possible link.

²² Not that the phrase is necessarily dismissive. At *Lach.* 187c2 αὐτοὺς δὲ χρὴ γιγνώσκειν politely invites Nicias and Laches to join the discussion if they are willing.

²³ Both Badham and Bury cite *Grg.* 505c, but only for the linguistic usage, not as a thematic parallel.

knowledge of the intentions of the author of the *Republic*, we do well to follow his lead.

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